More than four decades after Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution, the Middle East’s political landscape remains defined by a stark ideological contest. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini’s establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran sent shockwaves through a region dominated by secular regimes and conservative monarchies. Today, his successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei continues to champion a vision of Islamic governance that challenges regional stability and aspires to global reach. This news analysis examines how neighboring Muslim monarchies have preserved stability in the face of Iran’s revolutionary ideology, Iran’s efforts to export its political model abroad (even beyond the Muslim world), Khamenei’s ambition for a worldwide Islamic order, and how the threat of Islamic radicalism might compare to the colonial-era “White Man’s Burden” – especially if such radicalism were ever to become a dominant global force.

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Monarchies Under Siege: Stability Amid Iran’s Ideological Challenge

 The so-called “Shia Crescent” (green) stretching from Iran through Iraq and Syria to Lebanon, reflecting significant Shia populations that Iran seeks to leverage as part of its post-1979 regional influence.

When Iran’s Shah was overthrown in 1979, alarm bells rang in royal palaces from Riyadh to Amman. The fall of a pro-Western monarchy and rise of a Shi’ite Islamist theocracy represented, as one analysis put it, “a hostile state fully committed to wreaking havoc in Arab societies”. Revolutionary Iran openly encouraged the “oppressed” to rise up, directly threatening the legitimacy of neighboring monarchies. Saudi Arabia, Jordan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and others quickly recognized that Iran’s Islamic Republic sought not just to remake Iran, but to export its revolution across the Islamic world. King Khalid of Saudi Arabia initially offered cautious congratulations to Iran’s new rulers in 1979, hoping for “proximity and understanding”. But soon, events like the militant seizure of Mecca’s Grand Mosque and a Shi’a uprising in Saudi Arabia’s Eastern Province (both in late 1979) as well as an Iran-backed coup attempt in Bahrain in 1981 convinced Gulf leaders that Tehran’s incendiary rhetoric was translating into real subversion. By 1981, six Arab Gulf monarchies had formed the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) precisely to safeguard their regimes. Iranian conduct “shook Arab Gulf leaders to their core,” especially in states with large Shi’a populations such as Bahrain, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

Despite Iran’s efforts, the monarchies proved remarkably resilient. Analysts note that these regimes combined repression with reform to weather the ideological storm. In a study of Persian Gulf states’ “enigma of stability,” Daniel L. Byman and Jerrold D. Green observe that Gulf rulers actively fostered stability through a mix of tactics:

1. Robust security services to swiftly shut down violent dissent and surveil Islamist agitators.

2. Co-optation of dissenters – offering jobs, stipends, or perks to potential opposition figures to win their loyalty.

3. Divide-and-rule maneuvers, exploiting tribal, ethnic, or sectarian cleavages so that no unified revolutionary front could emerge.

4. Ideological adaptability, with monarchs burnishing their own Islamic credentials (for example, Saudi kings styling themselves “Custodians of the Holy Mosques”) to undercut Iran’s claim of leading an Islamic uprising.

5. Token political participation through advisory councils or limited elections, creating safety valves for public frustration without ceding real power.

6. Accommodative diplomacy abroad, including tighter alliances with Western powers and inter-Arab solidarity, both to deter Iran and to reassure restive citizens. (Notably, the GCC states collectively backed Iraq in the 1980–88 Iran-Iraq War to contain revolutionary Iran.)

These measures, along with immense oil wealth in some cases, helped the monarchies keep a lid on internal upheaval. Saudi Arabia funneled billions into social programs and ultra-conservative Sunni religious institutions – a two-pronged strategy of welfare and Wahhabism intended to immunize its population against Khomeini’s radical Shi’ite appeal. In Jordan, King Hussein (and later King Abdullah II) bolstered ties with Western allies and Gulf benefactors to buttress the kingdom’s economy and military, while tightly controlling Islamist groups at home. King Abdullah II famously warned in 2004 of a growing “Shia Crescent” of Iranian influence “from Beirut to the Persian Gulf,” calling it “very destabilising for the Gulf countries and actually for the whole region”. His phrase underscored Sunni monarchies’ fears that Iran’s revolution had unleashed a transnational sectarian wave linking Shia communities under Tehran’s sway.

To this day, officials in Riyadh, Abu Dhabi, and Manama routinely describe Iran as the primary menace to regional peace. “Out of every country in the region, the UAE is most vulnerable to Iran. Our military…wake up, dream, breathe, eat, sleep the Iranian threat,” UAE Ambassador Yousef al-Otaiba said in 2010. Such anxieties have driven unprecedented cooperation among the Sunni Arab states (even warming ties with Israel) to counter Iran’s network of proxies in Lebanon, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. In short, the ideological challenge posed by Iran’s Islamic Revolution has been met with a durability and defensive coordination among Muslim monarchies that few predicted in 1979. While Iran’s regional meddling has certainly fueled wars and militancy, the ruling kings and emirs themselves have so far avoided Khomeini’s fate befalling any of their thrones.

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Exporting the Revolution: Iran’s Global Ideological Push

From its inception, the Islamic Republic of Iran embraced a mission that extended far beyond Iran’s borders. As codified in Iran’s constitution, one of the “basic slogans” of the 1979 revolution is “the export of the revolution” – spreading the revolution “as a culture, ideology and an intellectual…method” to Islamic countries and even non-Islamic countries. In Ayatollah Khomeini’s own words, Islamic government under sharia law was never meant to be confined to Iran. “God did not will this form of government only for the country of Iran,” Khomeini wrote, arguing that Muslims must work to expand Islamic rule globally. He explicitly invoked the early Islamic conquests as a model: victory would not come through proselytizing alone, but by wielding whatever “force you can muster,” echoing a Quranic injunction. Khomeini even boasted that if a truly Islamic government were established, “none of the governments now existing in the world would be able to resist it; they would all capitulate”.

Such revolutionary zeal translated into concrete policies. In the 1980s, Iran formed and funded militant groups to export its Islamist agenda: the Lebanese Shi’ite militia Hezbollah was created with Iranian Revolutionary Guard support in 1982, Shi’a insurgents in Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Kuwait received training or inspiration from Tehran, and Iran’s new elite Quds Force began cultivating alliances with dissident Muslim movements from Africa to South Asia. The stated aim was to “liberate” oppressed peoples from both local tyrants and Western imperialism. As one scholar noted, Iran’s ideology drew on a “rich heritage of Iranian universalism” married to Islamist and even Marxist anti-imperialist ideas – framing Iran’s revolution as “for the oppressed around the world.” This narrative held appeal beyond Shi’ite circles. Some Sunni and even non-Muslim revolutionaries in the developing world saw Tehran as a champion against Western domination. (Indeed, Western leftist observers like Richard Falk initially hailed Khomeini’s regime as “a desperately-needed model of humane governance for a third-world country,” before Iran’s mass executions of opponents became apparent.)

Iran’s constitution (Article 154) commits the country to support “the struggles of the oppressed against the oppressors” everywhere. Practically, this has meant Iran positioning itself as the patron of “resistance” to U.S. and Israeli influence in the Middle East. Tehran’s long-standing slogan “Neither East nor West” signaled a rejection of both American and Soviet blocs in favor of an Islamic Third Way. Over time, Iran also forged ties beyond the Muslim world with any state or movement sharing its anti-Western bent. For example, in Latin America, Iran built cordial relations with socialist Venezuela and others, spreading an anti-U.S. message even where its theocratic model held little local appeal. Ayatollah Khamenei has gone so far as to portray global events as evidence that Iran’s revolution is resonating abroad – claiming credit for everything from the Occupy Wall Street protests to the Arab Spring uprisings, which he dubbed an “Islamic Awakening” inspired by Iran. This rhetorical reach shows Iran’s ambition to export its ideology globally, not only by arming proxy militias but by attempting to influence hearts and minds worldwide.

Iran’s persistence in this mission is notable. “Iran is as committed to exporting the Islamic Revolution today as it was in 1979,” observes a recent policy study. Over 40 years later, Iranian leaders still tout the internationalization of their revolution. “We’re responsible to introduce pure Islam to the world,” proclaimed Ali Saeedi, the Supreme Leader’s representative to the Revolutionary Guards. In 2017, Major General Mohammad Ali Jafari – then commander of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) – declared that Iran’s revolution “has now crossed borders” and entered a new phase as “an instrument for the expansion of the Islamic revolution and promotion of God’s religion around the world.” He described this as the “third stage” of the revolution: the establishment of Islamic governance beyond Iran’s borders. Such pronouncements are not mere bravado. They have been accompanied by Iran’s tangible efforts to grow an axis of allied forces: from Hezbollah in Lebanon, to Shi’ite militias in Iraq and Syria, to the Houthi rebels in Yemen – all clients or partners serving Iran’s aim of spreading its revolutionary model and undermining the old order of Western-backed states.

Crucially, Iran’s vision is not limited by religion or region. Khomeini and Khamenei couch their struggle in universal terms – justice for the downtrodden of all nations. In practice, however, non-Muslim countries targeted by Iran’s outreach often see it as destabilizing interference. (For instance, Argentina in the 1990s suffered Iranian-linked terror bombings of Jewish and Israeli targets, and Iranian operatives have been implicated in plots as far afield as Thailand and Bulgaria in the 2010s.) Yet Tehran’s leadership continues to view itself as vanguard of a global ideological movement. “The power and might of the Islamic revolution,” said IRGC adviser Ali Saeedi, has “so far thwarted all plots and evil actions” by Iran’s enemies, and despite pushback, Iran is “an influential power in the world” shaping new “power dynamics”. In the eyes of Iran’s revolutionaries, exporting their system is both a religious duty and a strategic necessity to secure Iran’s regime against isolation. The result has been an entrenched Cold War in the Middle East: Iran’s revolutionary republic vs. the status quo powers – a contest playing out via propaganda, politics, and proxy wars across the region.

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Khamenei’s Global Vision: An Islamic Order and Its Perils

Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Iran’s Supreme Leader since 1989, has carried forward Khomeini’s revolutionary doctrine – opposing Western influence and seeking to expand Iran’s model of Islamic governance globally.

As Iran’s Supreme Leader for the past 36 years, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has been the chief architect of Tehran’s domestic and foreign policy – and the guardian of its revolutionary ethos. Now 85, Khamenei rose to power in 1989 after Khomeini’s death, and he has cemented an uncompromising vision of political Islam in practice. Described by supporters as a steadfast “anti-imperialist” who challenges Western hegemony, Khamenei views the world in stark civilizational terms. He frequently critiques liberal democracy and capitalism as spiritually bankrupt, accusing the West of materialism and moral decay. In contrast, he touts Iran’s system as grounded in “justice, prayer, independence” – a divinely guided governance that he believes should ultimately prevail worldwide.

Khamenei’s ideological influences include Islamist theorists like Egypt’s Sayyid Qutb, who preached that Islam must dominate governance, and of course Khomeini himself. “Islam without government and a Muslim nation without Islam are meaningless,” Qutb wrote approvingly – a maxim Khamenei has echoed. According to Iran analyst Mohsen Milani, “Khamenei has made it his mission to preserve the revolutionary identity of the state, [ensuring] it remains devoted to Islamic principles and opposed to the West.” Under his rule, Iran has doubled down on supporting a “global Islamic awakening” – from financing militias that extend Iran’s reach, to hosting international Islamic unity conferences aimed at spreading Iran’s revolutionary narrative. In Khamenei’s worldview, Iran is not just a nation-state but the nucleus of an ideological revolution that must expand or die. He has referred to the United States as the “Great Satan” and insists that resistance to U.S. and Israeli influence is a religious imperative. Even uprisings and movements that are not explicitly pro-Iran (like the early Arab Spring protests in Egypt or anti-capitalist demonstrations in the West) are, in Khamenei’s rhetoric, signs of an epochal shift – evidence that “Western hegemony is in decline” and an Islamic alternative is rising.

The ambition of Ayatollah Khamenei to globally expand Islamic governance is not mere ideology; it carries real-world ramifications that worry observers both in the region and the West. Iranian leaders close to Khamenei openly speak of a coming “global Islamic government” with Iran at its center. Major General Yahya Rahim Safavi, a senior military adviser to Khamenei, claimed in late 2017 that such a worldwide Islamic governance order “would soon be established with its axis in Iran.” This grandiose vision implies a direct challenge to the current international system of nation-states, and especially to secular governance and pluralism. If Khamenei’s political theology were to spread unchecked, it could usher in a new era of theocracy extending beyond Iran’s borders. The risks to broader humanityencompass several layers:

First, there is the danger of intensified conflict. Khamenei’s tenure has already seen Iran’s involvement in multiple wars by proxy (Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, Yemen) to advance its revolutionary agenda. A more globally assertive Iran, or an Iran emboldened with nuclear capability under hardline ideological control, raises the specter of direct clashes with other powers. Israel’s defense minister recently went so far as to say Khamenei “can no longer be allowed to exist,” framing him as a threat that might justify extreme measures. Such rhetoric underscores how destabilizing Iran’s revolutionary drive is perceived; it could potentially trigger wider wars if not restrained.

Second, Khamenei’s vision poses a human rights challenge. The Islamic Republic’s model of governance has often meant strict social controls, suppression of dissent, and the export of these repressive tactics to its allies. Where Iran’s influence has grown, illiberal forces have gained ground – for instance, Hezbollah’s dominance in Lebanon or the empowerment of Iraq’s sectarian militias have often undermined democratic institution-building and fueled sectarian reprisals. Were an Iranian-style Islamist regime to gain supremacy over a broader region or globally, one could expect severe curbs on freedoms (especially for women and minorities) and the erosion of the modern norms of governance that prioritize individual rights. Khamenei unapologetically promotes clerical rule (velayat-e faqih) as the model for all Muslim societies, a system in which unelected theocrats wield ultimate power. The prospect of that model scaling up beyond Iran is chilling to secular and moderate voices in Muslim countries – and certainly to non-Muslim societies that would be deemed part of the dar al-kufr (realm of unbelief) in need of Islamic rule.

Finally, Khamenei’s global ambitions carry an almost apocalyptic undertone that troubles observers. His regime often couches geopolitical struggles in end-times or civilizational war rhetoric – portraying, for example, Israel as a cancer to be eradicated and confidently predicting the collapse of American power. Such ideologically driven certitude can lead to miscalculation. A leadership that believes history (or divine will) is on its side might be more prone to risk-taking, even brinkmanship, under the assumption that their cause must triumph. The international community has watched this dynamic play out in protracted disputes like Iran’s nuclear program: Tehran insists on what it sees as its sovereign and religious rights despite sanctions and isolation. Should Khamenei’s ideological protégés one day wield weapons of mass destruction or control a bloc of nations, the stability of the world order could be fundamentally shaken.

In essence, Ayatollah Khamenei’s pursuit of a transnational Islamic governance is a double-edged sword. To his followers, it heralds a just new world freed from Western domination. To his critics – which include not just Western governments but many of Iran’s neighbors and even disillusioned Iranian youths – it threatens to export the repression they know too well at home. The longer Khamenei’s Iran projects strength beyond its borders, the more we may see a global pushback forming against it, as countries coalesce to prevent an ideology they view as dangerous from upending the status quo.

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Islamic Radicalism vs. the ‘White Man’s Burden’: A New Global Threat?

The specter of Islamic radicalism becoming a dominant global superpower raises uncomfortable historical parallels. In the colonial era, Western imperial powers justified their global dominance with the concept of the “White Man’s Burden.” Coined by Rudyard Kipling in 1899, this idea held that it was the “duty” of white Europeans and Americans to “civilize” the non-white peoples of the world – ostensibly a noble mission to uplift “savage peoples,” but one that in practice entailed subjugation and exploitation. Imperialists spoke of a “civilizing mission” while erasing indigenous cultures and extracting resources, all the while portraying themselves as benefactors. Kipling’s famous line referring to colonized peoples as “half-devil and half-child” captured the racist paternalism underpinning the ideology.

Modern Islamist extremists exhibit a strikingly analogous mindset, albeit in religious terms. Militant groups like Al-Qaeda or the so-called Islamic State (ISIS) see their mission as a divine burden: to “save” the world by bringing it under the rule of their version of Islam. Just as colonial powers claimed moral authority to rule others for their own good, jihadist ideologues presume a mandate to enforce Sharia law globally, “for the good” of humanity as they conceive it. The results are equally grim. Whereas the colonial project carried out cultural genocide and economic pillage under the banner of enlightenment, a hypothetical global caliphate under Islamist radicals would likely enforce cultural and religious uniformity through violence. Indeed, during ISIS’s brief establishment of a “Caliphate” over parts of Iraq and Syria, the world got a glimpse of what an Islamist-superpower might entail: mass murder of those who would not submit, enslavement of minorities such as the Yazidis, systematic subjugation of women, and the destruction of historical heritage– all justified by a fanatical ideology. In President George W. Bush’s words after 9/11, “the ideology known as Islamic radicalism…exploits Islam to serve a violent political vision that calls for the murder of all those who do not share it.” This was no exaggeration: Al-Qaeda and ISIS’s propaganda openly envisioned a globe-spanning empire, with one 2005 U.S. intelligence report noting militants sought to “establish a radical Islamic empire that spreads from Spain to Indonesia.”

If Islamic radicalism were ever to become a dominant global force – an admittedly remote scenario, but one worth pondering – the consequences could be catastrophic. The colonial “White Man’s Burden” mindset led to the subjugation of millions and numerous atrocities, yet it operated within certain constraints of the international order of the time and the self-interest of empires. A globe dominated by Islamist extremists would likely not even pay lip service to concepts like national self-determination or universal human rights. Instead, it would impose a singular, harsh interpretation of religious law, with non-conformity brutally punished as apostasy or heresy. The diversity of cultures, religions, and lifestyles that currently exists would face an existential threat under a hegemonic caliphate. One need only recall the Taliban’sdraconian rule in Afghanistan or ISIS’s massacres and clerical fascism to imagine this future. Freedom of speech, gender equality, scientific inquiry – all the fruits of the modern era – could be rolled back. As one commentator put it, all extreme ideologies claiming a monopoly on truth are “fully capable of destroying humanity” in their quest to remake the world in their own image.

Yet, much like the colonized peoples of yesteryear resisted the white man’s “civilizing” mission, one can expect that the majority of the world’s Muslims (and certainly non-Muslims) would fiercely resist a tyrannical Islamist empire. It’s important to stress that Islamic radicalism is rejected by most of the Muslim world’s populace – who have no desire to live under Taliban- or ISIS-style rule any more than 19th-century Africans and Asians wanted to live under European colonial rule. In fact, the struggle against groups like ISIS has been led on the ground largely by Muslims themselves, who view these extremists as a distortion of their faith. The comparison between Islamist extremism and the “White Man’s Burden” thus serves as a cautionary tale: both involve a self-appointed vanguard trying to impose its idea of order on global society, and both inevitably engender violent resistance and immense human suffering.

To be sure, there are distinctions. Colonial powers, for all their moral posturing, were driven by economic exploitation and nationalist competition; radical Islamist movements are driven by a millenarian religious vision and grievances against modern geopolitical injustices. But the hubris is common to both – a belief in a superior way of life that must be spread by force if necessary. As Kipling urged Westerners to “bind your sons to exile, to serve your captives’ need”, so do jihadist recruiters urge young Muslims to leave home and fight “infidels” abroad in a grand campaign to “liberate” (or rather, conquer) others. The irony is palpable: each sees the other as barbaric and in need of saving.

In a scenario where Islamic radicalism became a global superpower, we might witness a new form of totalitarianism with a spiritual veneer – a sort of “theocratic international” in place of the secular ideologies of the 20th century (fascism or communism). The international community’s response to ISIS’s rise – a broad coalition that eventually crushed its territorial caliphate – suggests that humanity has little appetite to let such a force go unchecked. Just as the crimes of colonialism eventually galvanized international norms against empire, the crimes of groups like ISIS (declared “genocide” by the U.N. in the case of the Yazidi massacres) have galvanized a global consensus that violent extremism must be confronted. As President Bush said in 2005, the free world must “confront this mortal danger to all humanity” posed by Islamist terrorism, and indeed Muslim communities themselves “denounce an ideology that exploits Islam… and defiles a noble faith.”

Ultimately, the legacy of Iran’s Islamic Revolution and the radical movements it inspired is still unfolding. Iran’s regime endures and aggressively promotes its worldview, but it also faces significant pushback – from regional adversaries, from global powers, and not least from its own people (as seen in recurring domestic protests for reform). The comparison to the “White Man’s Burden” is a reminder that history’s would-be world saviors, whether clad in colonial pith helmets or revolutionary turbans, often end up imposing great misery under the guise of moral duty. If one ideological lesson has been learned, it’s that no single civilization or creed can or should dominate the globe. The 21st century’s struggle against Islamic radicalism, much like the 20th century’s repudiation of colonialism, is fundamentally about affirming the right of diverse peoples to chart their own destiny without violent tutelage by an overweening “savior.”

In the Middle East, that means the likes of Saudi Arabia, Jordan, and the UAE will continue fortifying themselves against Iran’s revolutionary gospel, even as they seek to address legitimate political and economic needs of their citizens so that Khamenei’s appeal finds no purchase. Globally, it means cooperative efforts to combat terrorism and extremist propaganda, while also engaging in the battle of ideas to counter the narrative that God demands the sword. The shadow of Iran’s 1979 revolution has loomed large over the region for decades – a source of both inspiration and instability. Whether that shadow expands or recedes will depend on the resilience of regional states, the choices of world powers, and the aspirations of ordinary Muslims who must decide whose vision of the future – the monarch’s, the mullah’s, or perhaps a new path altogether – will shape their lives.

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Sources:

• Byman, Daniel & Green, Jerrold. “The Enigma of Stability in the Persian Gulf Monarchies.” MERIA Journal(1999)ciaotest.cc.columbia.educiaotest.cc.columbia.edu.

• Middle East Institute. “Iran and the Gulf States 40 Years after the 1979 Revolution.”(2019)mei.edumei.edumei.edumei.edu.

• Middle East Institute. “Khamenei’s Aide Calls for Exporting Iran’s Revolution Abroad.”(2017)mei.edumei.edumei.edu.

• Tony Blair Institute for Global Change. “Ideology and Iran’s Revolution: How 1979 Changed the World.”(2020)institute.globalinstitute.global.

• Indian Express. “Explained: The life and beliefs of Iran’s Supreme Leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.”(2023)indianexpress.comindianexpress.com.

• Wikipedia. “The policy of exporting the Islamic Revolution.” (accessed 2025)en.wikipedia.orgen.wikipedia.org.

• Wikipedia. “Shia Crescent.” (accessed 2025)en.wikipedia.org.

• RFE/RL. “In Pictures: Iran’s 1979 Islamic Revolution.” (2019) – historical images and context of events.

• White House Archives. “Fact Sheet: President Bush’s Remarks on the War on Terror (Oct 6, 2005).”georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.govgeorgewbush-whitehouse.archives.govgeorgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov.

• Students of History. “Perspectives on the White Man’s Burden.” (2025)