Laxmi Chaudhary
Investigative opinion and regional security analysis | November 2024 – October 2026
Standfirst: A series of arrests involving Bangladeshi nationals in Kathmandu, Bangladesh's expanding narcotics economy linked to Myanmar, organised migration networks operating through India, repeated visits by Bangladeshi religious personalities and sustained diplomatic engagement with Nepalese youth organisations raise important questions about Nepal's emerging security vulnerabilities. The possibility of overlapping criminal, financial and ideological networks warrants urgent investigation.
1. Nepal's changing security environment
Nepal is increasingly exposed to transnational developments originating in Bangladesh and Myanmar. What were previously treated as separate issues—illegal migration, narcotics trafficking, foreign religious outreach, undocumented employment and youth mobilisation—now require a broader regional security assessment.
During 2025–2026, Nepalese authorities reported several cases involving Bangladeshi nationals:
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In April 2025, five Bangladeshi nationals were arrested in an alleged overseas employment fraud involving 13 victims.
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In June 2026, 24 Bangladeshi nationals were apprehended working in Kathmandu garment factories without appropriate documentation.
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In June 2026, 15 Bangladeshi nationals were arrested in an alleged online blackmail operation.
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In September 2026, ten Bangladeshi nationals were arrested in Thamel over alleged immigration violations.
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In November 2026, five Bangladeshi nationals were apprehended in Kathmandu, with 14 passports and financial diaries reportedly recovered.
These are separate investigations, not evidence of a single criminal organisation. Nevertheless, they raise serious questions about immigration enforcement, document fraud, employment regulation and the activities of foreign intermediaries.
2. Myanmar's narcotics economy: Bangladesh as a major trafficking environment
One of the strongest documented regional concerns is the expanding synthetic-drug economy connecting Myanmar and Bangladesh.
Bangladeshi investigative reporting by The Daily Star in September 2025 and August 2026 described the movement of yaba and crystal methamphetamine from Myanmar into Bangladesh through smuggling syndicates and intermediaries operating around Rakhine and the Naf River.
The August 2026 investigation reported that narcotics were increasingly being used as a form of payment for goods supplied to Myanmar's Arakan Army-controlled areas.
Bangladesh's Department of Narcotics Control reported seizures of approximately 43.56 million amphetamine-type stimulant tablets during 2025.
Further reporting in October 2026 described another major yaba seizure in Ukhiya, Cox's Bazar.
These developments establish that Bangladesh is an important part of the Myanmar-origin synthetic-drug economy. They also demonstrate the involvement of organised criminal networks and the existence of illicit financial relationships in the wider region.
The question now is whether these networks have established connections with Nepalese intermediaries or are attempting to exploit Nepal as an additional destination or transit market.
There is not yet sufficient public evidence to establish a continuous Myanmar-Bangladesh-Nepal narcotics corridor. However, the possibility deserves investigation through drug seizures, financial records, forensic evidence and cross-border intelligence.
3. The Bangladesh–India–Nepal trafficking corridor
Bangladesh's own investigative reporting has exposed organised migration networks exploiting Nepal.
A January 2026 investigation by The Business Standard, based on a National Security Intelligence assessment submitted to Bangladesh's Home Ministry, described brokers bringing Bangladeshi nationals through India into Nepal and subsequently exploiting them through fraudulent overseas employment arrangements, detention and extortion.
The reported route connected Petrapole, Kolkata, Siliguri and Kakarbhitta before reaching Kathmandu.
Developments in West Bengal reinforce the importance of this corridor.
In August 2026, Anandabazar Patrika reported arrests involving five Bangladeshi nationals in Malda and an Indian intermediary accused of helping undocumented foreign nationals.
Separately, a March 2026 investigation reported the apprehension of a Bangladeshi national near Panitanki with a forged Indian identity document. In June 2026, another Bangladeshi national was apprehended in Jhapa after allegedly attempting to enter Nepal unlawfully through the Mechi River area.
These incidents demonstrate that individual Bangladeshi nationals and trafficking intermediaries have exploited the India-Nepal geographical connection.
Malda, Siliguri, Panitanki and Kakarbhitta therefore deserve greater attention in regional anti-trafficking investigations.
4. Rohingya migration and the vulnerability of Koshi Province
The reported presence of 526 Rohingya in Kathmandu Valley in August 2026 raises questions about registration, immigration status, humanitarian protection and the intermediaries involved in their migration.
Eastern Nepal also requires attention.
Jhapa, Morang and Sunsari have significant cross-border employment and migration connections. Reporting from Jhapa has identified weaknesses in verifying seasonal workers entering from West Bengal, particularly those employed in brick industries.
These vulnerabilities could be exploited by trafficking brokers and document-fraud networks.
However, Rohingya refugees, undocumented migrants and individuals involved in criminal activity must be treated as distinct categories. Their legal status and individual conduct must be independently established.
The immediate requirement is better registration, protection and investigation of identified trafficking intermediaries.
5. Bangladeshi religious outreach and Tablighi Jamaat's activities
The increasing frequency of reported visits by Bangladeshi religious personalities deserves closer examination.
Religious gatherings in Jhapa, Sunsari and Morang in February 2025, the arrival of nine Bangladeshi religious personalities in Kathmandu in July 2026 and earlier foreign delegations attending proposed religious assemblies demonstrate sustained cross-border religious engagement.
A particularly significant development occurred in September 2026, when Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis leader Allama Mamunul Haque visited Nepal.
His organisation reported that he met Maulana Mohammad Khaled Siddiqui, a Nepalese National Assembly member and president of Jamiat Ulema-e-Nepal. Their discussions reportedly concerned Islamic education, Dawah, institutional cooperation and support for the proposed Darul Uloom Nepal.
This demonstrates direct engagement between Bangladeshi religious-political leadership and Nepalese religious institutions.
Tablighi Jamaat's transnational missionary activities should also be examined. Its religious outreach is not inherently political or militant, and attendance at an Ijtema does not establish extremist affiliation.
Nevertheless, the frequency of foreign preacher visits, their organisational affiliations, local hosts, financial sponsorship and repeat institutional relationships deserve transparent documentation.
The central concern is whether any specific individuals or organisations are exploiting legitimate religious outreach for unlawful recruitment, concealed financing or political mobilisation. That possibility requires evidence, not assumptions.
6. ASH Foundation and foreign-funded religious infrastructure in Sunsari
The Alhaj Shamsul Hoque Foundation's activities in Sunsari provide an identifiable example of Bangladesh-linked religious institutional engagement.
The foundation's own publications document its chairman's participation in the July 2025 foundation-stone ceremony for Masjid-e-Razzak in Inarwa, Sunsari, alongside its stated relationship with Madrassa Falahiyah.
The foundation subsequently rejected allegations of militancy and improper activities.
The organisation's Nepalese legal status, local partnerships, funding arrangements, land approvals and project accounts deserve independent verification.
The allegation that ASH Foundation has registered a separate humanitarian NGO in Bhokraha Narsingh Rural Municipality in Sunsari also requires confirmation regarding its stated purposes.
A foreign-funded mosque, madrassa or charitable project is not evidence of extremism. However, transparent financial disclosure and proper legal registration should be mandatory for every foreign-supported institution.
7. Bangladesh Embassy: Youth diplomacy and questions of institutional influence
Bangladesh's diplomatic engagement with Nepalese youth organisations has continued over several years.
The Embassy participated in the 2021 and 2023 youth conferences. The January 2025 Nepal-Bangladesh Youth Conclave brought together approximately 130 participants through Land of Future and Bangladesh International Youth Foundation.
The Embassy also hosted commemorative programmes relating to Bangladesh's July 2024 youth uprising, including engagements with Nepalese political and youth representatives.
These activities demonstrate sustained diplomatic and institutional networking.
They do not establish that the Embassy had engagements in Nepal's September 2025 Gen Z protests. Nevertheless, the Embassy's sponsorship, funding, institutional partnerships and relationships with local youth organisations deserve transparency.
The issue is not whether Bangladesh should engage with Nepalese youth. Such engagement is a legitimate aspect of diplomacy. The issue is whether all foreign-sponsored activities remain transparent, accountable and within the framework of normal diplomatic relations.
8. The possibility of overlapping criminal and ideological networks
The most important unresolved question is whether the separate developments are connected through common financial intermediaries, individuals or organisational relationships.
Three areas particularly deserve examination:
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Narcotics and illicit finance: Whether Myanmar-origin drug syndicates and Bangladesh-based criminal intermediaries have connections with Nepalese distribution or financial networks.
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Migration and document fraud: Whether the brokers facilitating Bangladeshi migration into Nepal are also involved in other forms of organised criminal activity.
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Religious and institutional outreach: Whether any identifiable foreign organisation or individual has used legitimate religious or youth programmes to facilitate unlawful recruitment, financing or political interference.
It is essential to distinguish Jamaat-e-Islami Bangladesh, Tablighi Jamaat, Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis and Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh. They are separate organisations, with different identities and activities. There is no verified evidence establishing that these organisations collectively direct trafficking, narcotics or destabilisation activities in Nepal.
The investigation must identify actual connections rather than infer them from religious affiliation or geographical proximity.
9. Implications for India and the Siliguri corridor
The developments also have implications for West Bengal, Bihar and India's northeastern states.
Malda and the wider Siliguri region are important geographical links between Bangladesh, Nepal and India's northeastern territories.
The documented trafficking cases, forged identity investigations and unauthorised border crossings demonstrate the need for stronger coordination between Indian and Nepalese authorities.
Myanmar-origin narcotics trafficking creates an additional challenge for Assam, Tripura, Mizoram, Manipur and other northeastern states.
There is no demonstrated evidence that one Bangladesh-based organisation controls criminal activities throughout these states. However, trafficking, narcotics distribution, fraudulent documentation and illicit financial flows warrant a coordinated regional response.
10. Strategic warning: Nepal must strengthen its institutional safeguards
Nepal should immediately prioritise:
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A verified register of foreign religious visitors and their institutional affiliations.
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Transparent registration and financial oversight of foreign-funded charities and religious institutions.
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Stronger verification of foreign workers in garment factories and industrial establishments.
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Improved monitoring of immigration violations and fraudulent travel documents.
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Better coordination with India and Bangladesh on trafficking and narcotics investigations.
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Independent verification of ASH Foundation's Nepalese operations and alleged company registration.
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Transparent documentation of foreign-funded youth initiatives and diplomatic partnerships.
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Stronger financial investigations into any identified links between criminal syndicates and proscribed extremist organisations.
Conclusion: A regional security challenge that Nepal cannot afford to ignore
The developments of 2025 and 2026 suggest that Nepal is increasingly exposed to the consequences of Bangladesh's internal security challenges, Myanmar's narcotics economy and the wider instability of India's eastern borderlands.
The expansion of synthetic-drug trafficking from Myanmar into Bangladesh, the exploitation of Bangladesh-India-Nepal migration routes, the arrest of Bangladeshi nationals in Kathmandu and the growing institutional presence of Bangladeshi religious and youth organisations together create a security environment that demands greater scrutiny.
The most serious concern is the possibility that organised migration brokers, narcotics syndicates, illicit financial intermediaries and particular extremist actors could exploit the same regional vulnerabilities. Whether these networks share common facilitators remains an unresolved but important investigative question.
The visits of Bangladeshi religious personalities, including the September 2026 visit by Bangladesh Khelafat Majlis leader Mamunul Haque, the activities of Tablighi Jamaat and other missionary networks, and the expansion of Bangladesh-linked religious projects in Sunsari demonstrate the importance of understanding the scale and nature of foreign religious engagement in Nepal.
Similarly, the Bangladesh Embassy's repeated youth conferences, institutional partnerships and public engagement with Nepalese youth movements deserve transparent examination. Diplomatic cooperation is legitimate, but foreign sponsorship and institutional relationships should remain accountable.
For Nepal, the challenge is to ensure that its open borders, industrial employment market, religious institutions, charitable organisations and youth networks cannot be exploited by transnational criminal or extremist actors.
For India, the implications extend from Malda and West Bengal to Bihar and the northeastern states, where trafficking, narcotics and Myanmar-related instability create overlapping challenges.
The central warning is that the convergence of narcotics trafficking, organised migration, illicit finance and extremist recruitment could create a serious regional security problem even when the actors involved do not belong to a single organisation.
Nepal and India must therefore move beyond isolated arrests and fragmented investigations. They need coordinated financial intelligence, verified immigration records, transparent foreign institutional registration and stronger cooperation against identified criminal networks.
The objective should not be to stigmatise Bangladesh, its Muslim population, legitimate religious institutions or vulnerable Rohingya refugees. It should be to identify and prosecute those individuals and organisations demonstrably involved in trafficking, narcotics, violent extremism or unlawful foreign interference.
The sovereignty, democratic stability and national security of Nepal and India's eastern and northeastern regions will increasingly depend on their ability to identify these transnational networks before criminal and extremist actors become embedded in the region's economic, social and institutional structures.